
I was up in Johannesburg earlier this year, and last December, reading The Citizen and going around the city. What struck me was not just how bad things looked, but whether it would even be possible to rebuild Johannesburg as a city. It seems to me there isn’t the will, and there aren’t the qualified people anymore, to do it. The money required to rescue it is on such a gigantic scale that it seems impossible to do.
That is not being negative. It is being realistic.
Johannesburg was a mining town that grew and grew until it became the major city in the country. Countless investments were poured into it—millions upon millions—because everybody wanted to be there, especially in the centre. The CBD at one stage was amazing. My recollection of the city in the 1980s was that it was very well run by a top mayor. In those days you had your town clerk, also a top person, and then your various departments and engineers to run the city. They were not perfect. But everything was in place. And there was not a ruling political party agenda to steal money.
Now, after years of the ruling party stealing money from Johannesburg and destroying it, one begins to wonder: could Johannesburg really be saved? Where are those competent people—including a mayor—to run the city? Where is that competent town clerk? Where are all the qualified engineering people to build and supervise the infrastructure of the city?
The figures confirm what anybody who drives around Johannesburg already knows. The city’s overall infrastructure backlog is estimated at more than R220 billion. The water network alone has a renewal backlog of R26.6 billion to R32 billion; at current spending rates, replacing the city’s ageing pipes would take nearly 200 years. The electricity backlog is R44 billion, and between July and December 2025 the city recorded 54,132 power outages. Johannesburg is losing 44.7% of its water through leaks, theft and damaged infrastructure, and electricity losses have climbed to 27.1%. Financially, the city owes creditors R25.2 billion while holding only R3.9 billion in cash.
This is not a maintenance problem. It is the physical result of a system that stopped being maintained decades ago.
The Centre for Development and Enterprise calls it a “destructive feedback loop”: poor governance destroys the finances, which halts maintenance, which pushes skilled people and businesses out, which further erodes the tax base and leaves even fewer resources to fix the city. Between April 2025 and June 2026, Johannesburg lost 90,000 jobs, while Cape Town gained 57,000. Capital expenditure has collapsed to 6% of the city’s budget, and maintenance spending stands at just 0.5% of asset value—roughly one-eighteenth of the metro average.
But the deeper problem is the political system designed break the city. Since 2016, Johannesburg has had nine mayors and eight coalition administrations, and no mayor has completed a full five-year term. Each new coalition brings its own priorities, its own loyalists and its own appetite for the city’s procurement budget. Political allegiance has frequently taken precedence over whether appointees have the skills for the job. That is the mechanism behind the “fronts” put up to steal money from the city. It is called cadre deployment, and it is deeply entrenched in the city’s entities and administration.
The competence deficit is measurable. None of the board members of Johannesburg Water are professionally qualified engineers, even as that utility faces a R26.6 billion renewal backlog. At least seven of the city’s 24 most senior management positions are held by acting appointees, and the city’s own reports point to persistent vacancies among engineers, finance professionals, project managers and supply-chain experts. There is a documented exodus of engineers and technicians from the broader system, with losses of up to 30% in some technical areas. People remember the town clerk and the city engineer as central, respected figures. Today the technical core of the city has been hollowed out, and the people who remain are often acting in posts they were never properly appointed to fill.
Business has said very little, and business’s input into Johannesburg is very little too. They have watched it decline, too scared to say anything because of the ruling party—because they’ll lose contracts, or just be scandalised by the ruling party even if they’re not doing business with them. Business for South Africa has now assembled over 750 subject-matter experts and pledged over R350 million in support, and more than 160 CEOs have signed a pledge to get personally involved. But Martin Kingston of B4SA admits the intervention is “11th-hour stuff” and that the existing multiplicity of initiatives is “not having the impact that is required.” Business has explicitly ruled out engaging in politics. That is precisely the scared posture of business: a sector that knows the city is failing, that has expertise to offer, but that has been unwilling to confront the political networks that make reform impossible.
So what would it take to rebuild Johannesburg—if it could be done at all?
First, a stable and honest political leadership, and a break from the coalition chaos. The CDE is blunt: Johannesburg can recover only if elections produce stable, honest political leadership. Without a minimum level of political stability, no amount of money or expertise will stick.
Second, institutional reform that gives technical units real autonomy. The city’s administration only exists in name; too much power lies with the council, and the city manager has no inherent authority to hire staff or make operational decisions. The utilities—City Power, Johannesburg Water, Pikitup—must be given real operational autonomy and shielded from patronage.
Third, massive, sustained capital investment—and the capacity to spend it. The city currently lacks the project-management and engineering capacity to deploy money effectively. That means rebuilding in-house engineering competence and large-scale technical training, including youth brigades of qualified and apprentice plumbers to repair leaks, and artisan teams to fix potholes and streetlights.
Fourth, a coalition of outside capacity: private sector, universities and civil society. Not as a substitute for a functioning state, but as a scaffold around a state that is finally willing to be rebuilt.
Fifth, confronting the criminal and patronage networks that benefit from the status quo and will resist reform. Revenue collected for utilities often fails to reach maintenance. Non-revenue water losses exceed 40%. Any serious rebuild must include enforcement against these networks, not just new infrastructure spending.
There are pockets of Johannesburg that still remain. The western CBD, once considered “written off,” is quietly becoming an “Education Town,” with philanthropists donating buildings for tech campuses and thousands of students returning to restored historic office blocks. These are exceptions that prove the rule. They show what competence can do in a small space. They do not show that the centre can be rebuilt.
The beginning of the end was decades ago, when the ruling party failed to rule the city but put up fronts to steal money from it. Johannesburg has plunged into chaos. You will get people who say you can’t be negative about Johannesburg. But there is a thing as being realistic.
Could Johannesburg really be saved? Not in its current political form. The physical rebuild is daunting, but the deeper obstacle is the absence of a political settlement that would allow competent people to run the city without being undermined or replaced. Until that political economy is broken—not just voted out, but structurally dismantled—the will and the people I remember will not return to run the city. It is going to be an interesting city to watch. But it cannot yet be saved. Time has run out. Five years is too short a mandate to fix the city.
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