Note on terminology: This article uses “irregular migration” where the legal distinction matters — particularly in relation to asylum seekers, whose status is not necessarily determined at the point of arrival — and “illegal immigration” where it refers specifically to unlawful entry or residence.
Illegal immigration has become a polarising force for governments, especially in Europe. Germany and Italy are experiencing a move towards the right, with immigration and border control among the issues driving political change. It is understandable that there have been protests against illegal immigration. Communities, whatever their size, have seen their demographic profile and culture change, while schools, hospitals and other public services have come under greater pressure. There was a time when there was a softening stance towards irregular migration, but that has changed as voters have registered its impact on their communities and cultural life.
In Sweden, a strong line has been taken against irregular migration, with the government actively encouraging and facilitating the return of people who have no right to remain. The burden on receiving countries has become so significant that, in some instances, governments are offering financial incentives to encourage people to return to their countries of origin. The deeper problem, however, is that many sending countries have been unable to create the economic and political conditions that would reduce the incentive to leave. In some cases, these are countries with weak institutions, fragile economies or persistent conflict.
For many irregular migrants, the motivation is not easily divided between political asylum and economic survival. The two are often intertwined. They may be fleeing persecution or conflict while also seeking access to jobs, education and health services. This overlap places particular pressure on asylum systems designed primarily to protect people fleeing persecution rather than to manage large-scale economic migration.
There is also a question about how receiving countries’ financial support to sending and transit countries is used. Money intended to strengthen borders, improve migration management or address the underlying causes of migration does not always produce the results expected of it. Weak institutions, corruption and poor implementation can undermine programmes intended to reduce irregular migration.
The United Kingdom has dealt with irregular migration for decades. Prime Minister Andy Burnham has placed quality of life and regional economic development among his priorities, while his government has also pursued tighter migration controls. The emphasis on quality of life can be read as an attempt to reassure voters that the government understands the social consequences of continued irregular migration. The political challenge is to reconcile that concern with the continuing demand for labour and the humanitarian obligations attached to the asylum system.
The American situation has been much publicised. Illegal immigration is substantial, which is why the current government is trying to stem flows across the southern border and from other regions. The United States is one of a relatively small number of countries that have become magnets for migrants because of their economic opportunities, political stability and established communities. The countries from which migrants come vary widely, and not all can be characterised as failed states.
South Africa is vulnerable to irregular immigration because the government has struggled to match immigration policy with effective enforcement. Policies and their execution have not always been fully aligned. The result has been decades of migration from neighbouring countries, particularly Zimbabwe and Malawi, through a mixture of regular, irregular and asylum channels.
Illegal immigration has become such a politically charged issue that the March and March movement organised a major protest on 30 June 2026. The demonstrations were accompanied by demands for the removal of undocumented migrants and came after months of anti-migrant unrest, including violence, deaths and displacement. March and March has proposed another march for 30 September 2026. The protests have forced immigration further into the political debate, but they have also demonstrated the dangers of allowing immigration enforcement to move from the state into the hands of private citizens.
The South African situation exposes a serious failure of state capacity. Many ordinary citizens feel that their access to schools, hospitals, housing and other public services is being compromised, while unemployment and poverty remain exceptionally high. The government has announced various enforcement measures, but public confidence in the implementation of immigration policy remains low. The timing is also politically sensitive, with local government elections approaching and political parties facing the difficult task of addressing public frustration without inflaming xenophobia.
The opposition parties have not, for the most part, built their political strategies primarily around immigration. That has left space for movements outside the established party system to frame the issue in increasingly forceful terms.
The European Reckoning
The scale of the political shift is remarkable. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany won 43.8 percent of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt’s September 2026 state election, securing 39 of 83 seats and falling just short of an outright majority. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union won 17.2 percent, its worst result in the state. The AfD’s result was more than double its 2021 showing. The AfD’s regional branch has been classified as a proven right-wing extremist organisation by the state’s domestic intelligence service. The result represents a historic breakthrough for the German far right and has put the country’s long-standing political firewall under severe pressure.
The significance extends beyond the result itself. Germany’s postwar political system has long relied on the refusal of mainstream parties to cooperate with the far right. The AfD’s advance is testing that arrangement as never before. The party still faces a political barrier to forming a government, but its electoral strength means that immigration, security and the wider question of national identity can no longer be treated as marginal issues.
Italy has pioneered what can be called a bifurcated migration system. On one side is a highly visible, restrictive asylum regime — extended detention, tighter family reunification rules and measures aimed at preventing irregular arrivals. The flagship initiative is the Albania protocol: offshore processing centres where asylum claims can be handled before people who have no right to remain are potentially returned. The EU’s new return framework, agreed in June 2026, allows member states to establish return hubs in third countries, following the logic of the Italian experiment.
Yet Italy simultaneously operates a substantial legal labour-migration programme. Its decreto flussi for 2026–2028 provides for 497,550 non-EU worker entries over the three years, with labour sought in sectors including care, agriculture, hospitality and construction.
The Italian case suggests a political logic in which visible disorder is penalised while less visible labour migration is tolerated. The result may be a system that signals control while depending on the migration it publicly seeks to restrict. The contradiction is likely to become more pronounced as Italy’s ageing population and labour shortages increase.
Sweden represents perhaps the most dramatic policy reversal. It took in about 163,000 asylum seekers in 2015, the highest number per capita in the European Union. By 2025, that number had fallen sharply. The government, backed in parliament by the Sweden Democrats, now offers substantial financial grants to encourage voluntary repatriation. From 1 January 2026, the repatriation grant amounts to SEK350,000 per adult and SEK25,000 per child, with a maximum joint grant of SEK500,000 for a married or cohabiting couple.
The scheme’s practical effect has so far been modest. Only 171 people had accepted the offer by September 2026, reinforcing the argument that its political signalling may be more important than its numerical impact.
The South African Anomaly
South Africa presents a different configuration. There is no AfD, no Rassemblement National, no party of the European radical right. The African National Congress remains dominant, and opposition parties have not organised primarily around immigration. Yet the March and March movement has filled a vacuum that political parties have left open, staging major anti-illegal-immigration demonstrations and forcing immigration onto the political agenda.
This is the comparative insight South Africa offers. The immigration backlash does not necessarily have to produce a successful political party before it changes government behaviour. Movements outside the political establishment can occupy the space that conventional politics leaves unattended, forcing the state to respond even without a party vehicle. Where the state loses credibility on borders, someone else claims the issue — and the consequences can extend well beyond domestic politics.
The movement insists it is not xenophobic, arguing that its campaign targets illegal immigration rather than race or nationality. It demands audits of trading licences, asylum-seeker visas and business permits across all nationalities. Critics point out that the visible targets are overwhelmingly poor black Africans, and that the rhetoric surrounding the “cleaning” of streets has a long and sometimes violent lineage in South Africa.
The protests have also demonstrated the danger of allowing immigration enforcement to move from the state into the hands of private citizens. South African authorities have warned that members of the public have no right to demand documentation or proof of nationality from other people. Incidents surrounding the June protests included looting, intimidation and attacks on foreign-owned businesses. At least four people had died in the wider unrest surrounding the anti-migrant mobilisation, according to Reuters.
The movement’s actions have forced the government to respond, but they have also exposed a deeper reality: weaknesses in South Africa’s immigration enforcement, particularly in the administration of documentation and border controls, have created the conditions for vigilante politics.
President Cyril Ramaphosa has condemned xenophobia while simultaneously moving towards tougher enforcement. The government has announced measures including faster processing and verification of undocumented foreign nationals, more efficient deportation procedures and greater enforcement at border posts. The state has also emphasised that immigration enforcement is its responsibility, not that of private groups.
The scale of the enforcement effort has increased. Between 1 April and 31 July 2026, 18,816 people were formally deported, while 3,016 undocumented foreign nationals were awaiting deportation at the Lindela Repatriation Centre. Between 14 June and 20 August, authorities processed 86,596 foreign nationals for deportation or repatriation through coordinated law-enforcement operations. Cumulatively, deportations over the two financial years rose by 46 percent, reaching 109,344 by 31 March 2026.
The deeper parallel with Europe is economic. In both cases, immigration has become the visible symptom of a deeper failure: the state’s inability to deliver security, services and dignity to its citizens. Europe’s far right offers reversal. South Africa’s March and March offers expulsion. Neither addresses all of the structural conditions that produced the anger.
The True Drivers of Migration
The nationalities dominating irregular arrivals in Europe and the United Kingdom are not random. Many come from countries where conflict, repression, economic collapse or weak governance have made life difficult or dangerous.
In Europe, the principal nationalities vary by migration route. The pattern includes people from countries such as Bangladesh, Eritrea, Egypt, Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria and Somalia. Asylum applications have also included substantial numbers of Venezuelans, Afghans and Syrians.
The UK’s small-boat crossings reached 41,472 people in 2025, the second-highest annual figure on record after 45,774 in 2022. The five most common nationalities among small-boat arrivals were Eritrean, Afghan, Iranian, Sudanese and Somali.
The cordon sanitaire that once isolated anti-immigration parties is gone. What replaces it will define politics for a generation. The question is not whether the right will shape migration policy — it already does — but whether it can govern while confronting the contradictions its policies create.
The evidence points to a consistent set of push factors that border enforcement alone cannot address: conflict and political repression, economic collapse and weak labour markets, governance failure and, increasingly, climate shocks.
Political analysts also point to governments whose leaders refuse to relinquish power, weakening democratic accountability and economic reform. Where economic opportunity is scarce, political accountability weak and conflict persistent, the incentive to leave becomes stronger. But the relationship is not linear. Economic development can itself increase migration in the short term by giving more people the means to travel.
Much of the research suggests that tougher border controls can divert migration routes rather than eliminate migration altogether. When one corridor is closed, smugglers adapt, and migrants may be pushed towards longer and more dangerous journeys.
Crucially, the asylum system is being stretched because legal labour-migration pathways available to people from many of these countries are small relative to demand. When the only door left open is the asylum door, people will use it — regardless of whether their primary motivation is political persecution, economic survival or a combination of the two.
The Dependency Dividend
The most uncomfortable truth about the global migration system is that sending countries are not passive victims of forces beyond their control. They can become, whether by design or by default, beneficiaries of a system that reduces some of the immediate pressure to solve domestic economic and governance problems.
The scale of remittance dependency in some major sending countries is substantial. Tajikistan’s remittances equalled 47.89 percent of GDP in 2024, among the highest proportions in the world. Nepal’s remittances reached 26.23 percent of GDP, while Bangladesh’s accounted for 6.11 percent.
The more difficult question is whether high remittance dependence can reduce the pressure for governments to undertake difficult structural reforms. In some economies, remittances sustain household consumption and reduce poverty, but they can also reinforce an economic model in which young people are prepared to leave rather than to create businesses and employment at home.
This can create a cycle: weak domestic economies encourage emigration; emigration generates remittances; remittances support households and foreign-exchange earnings; and the resulting income can reduce some of the immediate political pressure for domestic reform. Countries may gradually come to rely on exporting labour rather than creating enough productive employment for that labour at home.
This dependency is compounded by direct payments from receiving countries to origin and transit states for migration management. These arrangements are extensive and growing. The EU’s €7.4 billion partnership with Egypt for 2024–2027 includes €200 million for migration management. Similar arrangements have been made or negotiated with other origin and transit countries.
These arrangements create a difficult political bargain. Receiving countries want governments in origin and transit countries to contain migration, while those governments have an incentive to use their strategic position to obtain financial and political concessions.
The evidence on the effectiveness of some of these programmes is troubling. The European Court of Auditors examined the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and found that 33 of the 115 investments it examined were no longer operational, while another 66 risked becoming unsustainable. The audit also identified problems including unused equipment, failures by local authorities to comply with agreements and weaknesses in the sustainability of funded projects.
The findings raise a more fundamental question: whether money intended to address the drivers of migration is reaching the institutions capable of using it effectively.
The Contradiction at the Heart of the System
The most striking feature of the global migration system is its economic incoherence. Europe’s demographic clock is ticking. The EU is ageing rapidly, while its working-age population is contracting. Germany faces significant labour shortages. Italy’s population has stabilised after years of decline largely because net migration has offset its natural population loss.
Yet the political incentives push in the opposite direction. Governments tighten asylum while expanding legal labour migration, a contradiction that satisfies neither restrictionists nor businesses.
If far-right parties gain power and actually implement mass deportations, they will collide with economic reality. If they moderate their policies, they risk alienating their political base. But even symbolic policies have real effects: they may signal to immigrants that they are unwanted, with consequences for integration and social cohesion.
The result may be a system in which irregular migration acts as a pressure valve for failing or fragile states, allowing governments to export some of their economic and governance problems rather than addressing them. Too little of the money flowing from receiving to sending countries is necessarily being converted into productive capacity. Much of it is directed towards managing the consequences of weak development, weak institutions and weak borders.
And the people who suffer most are not necessarily the receiving countries’ taxpayers, or the governments of sending countries. They are often the migrants themselves — caught between governments that depend on their departure and receiving countries that increasingly resent their arrival.
A Reckoning Deferred
For receiving countries, the challenge is to reclaim credibility on borders without abandoning the economic and humanitarian realities that make migration necessary. That means distinguishing between people who have a legal right to remain, those who do not, and those who need workable legal routes into labour markets.
For sending countries, the challenge is to break the cycle of dependency that can make labour export a substitute for development. Remittances can support households and economies, but they cannot substitute indefinitely for functioning institutions, productive investment and domestic employment.
For the international system, the challenge is to create legal migration pathways that reflect the scale of global demand rather than forcing desperate people into an asylum system never designed to handle large-scale economic migration.
Until these challenges are addressed, the political earthquake will continue. Communities will continue to change. Public services will continue to strain. And voters will continue to punish those they hold responsible.
The migration reckoning is not coming.
It is already here.
Sources
• Reuters, reporting on the Saxony-Anhalt state election and the AfD’s 43.8 percent result, September 2026.
• The Guardian, reporting on the Saxony-Anhalt election, September 2026.
• Associated Press, reporting on the AfD’s historic victory in Saxony-Anhalt, September 2026.
• Reuters, “As election looms, Sweden’s government is paying immigrants to leave,” 8 September 2026.
• Swedish Migration Agency, information on the increased repatriation grant, 2026.
• UK Home Office, Immigration System Statistics: How many people come to the UK via illegal entry routes?, February 2026.
• Italian Decreto Flussi 2026–2028, providing for 497,550 non-EU worker entries over three years.
• Council of the European Union, agreement on the EU return framework, June 2026.
• European Court of Auditors, Special Report 17/2024: The EU Trust Fund for Africa.
• European Commission, EU–Egypt Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership, 2024–2027.
• World Bank data, remittances as a percentage of GDP.
• South African Government, Home Affairs, “Deportations rise over two financial years,” April 2026.
• South African Government / Border Management Authority, migration-enforcement updates, 2026.
• Reuters, “South Africa’s anti-migrant protesters march nationwide, after thousands flee violence,” 30 June 2026.
• Swedish Migration Agency, “Ten years since 2015 – what happened?”, October 2025.
• ISTAT, Demographic Indicators – Year 2025, 2026.
